We study a non-cooperative communication game being played by national policymakers in

a two-country economy including a beauty-contest argument in the utility function of agents

and cross-border technology spillovers. Each policymaker receives some information either

solely on the home technology idiosyncratic shock or on both shocks. She has the choice of

revealing or not the received signal(s). The equilibrium of the non-cooperative game being

played by policymakers may entail revelation, either full or partial, or opacity, full or partial.

This crucially depends on the interplay between the size of countries and the strength of the

beauty contest motive. From a normative point of view, full or partial opacity may be optimal,

showing that the social value of some public information may be negative due to cross-border

spillovers. Public information provided by non-cooperative policymakers may be too little or

too much.

JEL Codes : D82, E61

Keywords : communication policies, beauty contest, public information, policy games