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Olivier Bos

Research Faculty

Professor

ENS Paris-Saclay

Research group: Economic Theory

Contact

Office: 2A17a

Email: olivier.bos@ens-paris-saclay.fr

 

Research Interests:

Mechanism Design, Auction Theory, Game Theory, Voting, Microeconomics.

Short bio

Olivier Bos completed his PhD in 2009 at Paris School of Economics. Before joining ENS Paris-Saclay (September 2021), he was assistant professor and then associate professor at University Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas. He is a research fellow of the ZEW- Mannheim since 2017, and a CESifo fellow since 2018. He was awarded Junior Member at Institut Universitaire de France (IUF) for the period 2016-2021. He was also a postdoctoral research fellow at University of Cologne in 2009-2010.

Olivier Bos is CEPS director (with Grégory Verdugo) and Associate Dean for the Department of Social Sciences of ENS Paris-Saclay since 2022. He was the director of the Master degree program in economics in 2021-2022.

His main research interests focus on microeconomics, and cover mechanism design, auction theory, game theory. His work broadly consists in the study of price formation and its role played in the structure of markets. He intends to determine how to allocate scarce resources via price mechanisms, and aims to design successful markets with desirable goals such as revenue maximization, allocative efficiency and stability. Some of his current research agenda analyses how public reputational concerns affect agents’ behaviour and the outcome in mechanisms. It aims to advance and deepen our understanding of mechanisms, such as auctions and voting procedures, with signalling concerns; and therefore, to use this knowledge to provide new perspectives on classical topics on mechanism and organisation design (e.g., public procurement, reduce harmful emissions to their efficient level without infracting upon productive efficiency, charitable organisations).

 

Publications

Working Papers

How Lotteries Outperform Auctions

Economics Letters, vol. 110(3), pp. 262-264. DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.025, 2011

Olivier Bos

Wars of Attrition and All-Pay Auctions with Stochastic Competition,

Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 48(2), pp. 83-91. DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.12.002, 2012

Olivier Bos

All-Pay Auction with Polynomial Rewards

Annals of Economics and Statistics, vol. 115-116, pp. 361-377. DOI: /10.15609/annaeconstat2009.115-116.361, 2014

Olivier Bos & Martin Ranger

Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 118(4), pp. 785-815. DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12164, 2016

Olivier Bos & Béatrice Roussillon & Paul Schweinzer

Charity Auctions for the Happy Few

Mathematical Social Sciences, vol 79(C), pp. 83-92. DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.12.002, 2016

Olivier Bos

Risk and Unraveling in Labor Markets

Annals of Economics and Statistics, vol. 129, pp. 127-144. DOI: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.129.0127, 2018

Olivier Bos & Martin Ranger

Charitable Asymmetric Bidders

Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(2), pp. 320-337. DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12406, 2020

Olivier Bos

Signalling in Auctions: Experimental Evidence

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 187, pp. 448-469. DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.001, 2021

Olivier Bos & Francisco Gómez Martínez & Sander Onderstal & Tom Truyts

Auctions with Signaling Concerns

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, vol. 30(2), pp. 420-448. DOI: 10.1111/jems.12406, 2021

Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts

Signalling in Auctions for Risk-Averse Bidders

PLOS One, forthcoming, DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0275709, 2022

Olivier Bos & Sander Onderstal & Francisco Gómez Martínez

Entry in First-price Auctions with Signaling

International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 52, pp. 423-450, 2023

Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts

No Working Paper