
Olivier Bos
Research Faculty
Professor
ENS Paris-Saclay
Research group: Economic Theory
Personal Website
Research Interests:
Mechanism Design, Auction Theory, Voting, Microeconomics.
Short bio
Olivier Bos completed his PhD in 2009 at Paris School of Economics. Before joining ENS Paris-Saclay (September 2021), he was assistant professor and then associate professor at University Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas. He is a research fellow of the ZEW- Mannheim since 2017, and a CESifo fellow since 2018. He was awarded Junior Member at Institut Universitaire de France (IUF) for the period 2016-2021. He was also a postdoctoral research fellow at University of Cologne in 2009-2010.
Olivier Bos is CEPS Director (with Stefano Bosi) and Deputy Head of Social Sciences Department of ENS Paris-Saclay since 2022. He was the director of the Master degree program in economics in 2021-2022.
His main research interests focus on microeconomics, and cover mechanism design, auction theory, game theory. His work broadly consists in the study of price formation and its role played in the structure of markets. He intends to determine how to allocate scarce resources via price mechanisms, and aims to design successful markets with desirable goals such as revenue maximization, allocative efficiency and stability. Some of his current research agenda analyses how public reputational concerns affect agents’ behaviour and the outcome in mechanisms. It aims to advance and deepen our understanding of mechanisms, such as auctions and voting procedures, with signalling concerns; and therefore, to use this knowledge to provide new perspectives on classical topics on mechanism and organisation design (e.g., public procurement, reduce harmful emissions to their efficient level without infracting upon productive efficiency, charitable organisations).
Publications
Working Papers
Media
How Lotteries Outperform Auctions
Economics Letters, vol. 110(3), pp. 262-264, 2011Olivier Bos
Wars of Attrition and All-Pay Auctions with Stochastic Competition,
Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 48(2), pp. 83-91, 2012Olivier Bos
All-Pay Auction with Polynomial Rewards
Annals of Economics and Statistics, vol. 115-116, pp. 361-377, 2014Olivier Bos & Martin Ranger
Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 118(4), pp. 785-815, 2016Olivier Bos & Béatrice Roussillon & Paul Schweinzer
Charity Auctions for the Happy Few
Mathematical Social Sciences, vol 79(C), pp. 83-92, 2016Olivier Bos
Risk and Unraveling in Labor Markets
Annals of Economics and Statistics, vol. 129, pp. 127-144, 2018Olivier Bos & Martin Ranger
Charitable Asymmetric Bidders
Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(2), pp. 320-337, 2020Olivier Bos
Signalling in Auctions: Experimental Evidence
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 187, pp. 448-469, 2021Olivier Bos & Francisco Gómez Martínez & Sander Onderstal & Tom Truyts
Auctions with Signaling Concerns
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, vol. 30(2), pp. 420-448, 2021Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts
Signalling in Auctions for Risk-Averse Bidders
PLOS One, 2022Olivier Bos & Sander Onderstal & Francisco Gómez Martínez
Entry in First-price Auctions with Signaling
International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 52, pp. 423-450, 2023Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts