Economic Theory Seminar
Informing to divert attention
Margarita Kirneva (CREST-Ecole Polytechnique)
We study a multidimensional Sender-Receiver game in which Receiver can acquire limited information after observing the Sender's signal. Depending on the parameters describing the conflict of interest between Sender and Receiver, we characterise optimal information disclosure and the information acquired by Receiver as a response. We show that in case of partial conflict of interests (aligned on some dimensions and misaligned on others) there is negative value of information in the sense that Receiver would be better off if she could commit not to extract private information or to have access to information of less quality. We present applications to optimal bonus policies in academia and to the optimal funding allocation between the projects.
CEPS - ENS Paris-Saclay, room 2E29
4 avenue des Sciences, 91190, Gif-sur-Yvette