We propose and axiomatize a new model of incomplete preferences under uncer-

tainty, which we call hope-and-prepare preferences. Act f is considered more desirable

than act g when, and only when, both an optimistic evaluation, computed as the wel-

fare level attained in a best-case scenario, and a pessimistic one, computed as the

welfare level attained in a worst-case scenario, rank f above g. Our comparison cri-

terion involves multiple priors, as best and worst cases are determined among sets of

probability distributions, and is, generically, less conservative than Bewley preferences

and twofold multi-prior preferences, the two ambiguity models that are closest to ours.1

Keywords: Decision theory; Incomplete preference; Multiple-selves; Non-obvious ma-

nipulability.

JEL classification: D01; D81; D90